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In the Monty Python skit "Self-Defense Against Fresh Fruit," 
Sergeant Major John Cleese instructs his feckless recruits on how to 
react to the risk of attack by someone armed with fresh fruit. I He 
starts by demonstrating how to defend against an attacker rushing at 
him with a banana. Cleese intones: "First of all, you force him to drop 
the banana; then, second, you eat the banana, thus disarming him. 
You have now rendered him 'elpless." Then, after egging on a recruit 
to attack him with a banana, Cleese pulls out a gun, shoots the 
attacker, then eats the banana. When a dismayed fellow recruit 
queries, "Suppose I'm attacked by a man with a banana and I haven't 
got a gun?," Cleese deadpans: "Run for it." 
Stuart Buck's article "The Common Law & The Environment in 
the Courts" reminds me of the flawed logic so hilariously portrayed in 
this Monty Python skit. By suggesting the straw man argument that 
common law remedies are offered as a complete substitute for 
statutory approaches to solving modem environmental problems, 
Buck is wildly shooting at imaginary bananas. No modem 
commentator that I know of has suggested that the common law 
should replace our well-developed network of statutory laws that 
address environmental problems.2 Supplement, yes, but not replace. 
Yet, Buck insists, "if some common law advocates got their wish, 
t Associate Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of 
Hawaii at Manoa. 
I Monty Python's Flying Circus, Self-Defense Against Fresh Fruit (BBCl television 
broadcast October 26, 1969). 
2 Buck seems to set up Professor Bill Rodgers as this would-be extremist by quoting his 
treatise's praise for the virtues of nuisance law, but Rodgers himself goes on to describe 
nuisance as the "backbone" not a substitute for modern statutory environmental law. Stuart 
Buck, The Common Law & The Environment in the Courts, 58 CASE w. REs. L. REv. 621 
(2008). 
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regulatory agencies would apparently be replaced (entirely?) by 
common law action.,,3 Entirely? Really? 
By setting up the extreme, Buck makes sensible common law 
advocates looks ridiculous. Yet, the fallacious premise makes for an 
unsatisfying analysis of the serious questions regarding the pros and 
cons of the common law in today's complex environmental litigation 
landscape. Buck fails to recognize the well-accepted value of 
common law in the modern statutory era as an interstitial remedy. 
And, he ignores (deliberately?) the less-well-accepted but equally 
obvious current use of common law litigation as a catalyst for policy 
change. These two fundamental values of "environmental common 
law" litigation-interstitial and catalytic-are, unfortunately, wholly 
ignored in his essay but of significant value in the real world of 
environmental advocacy. 
The weakness in Buck's premise becomes most evident in his 
conclusion where he admits he has to "equivocate" and acknowledges 
that courts "are good" at addressing certain kinds of disputes and that, 
"[a]s to such disputes, the common law can be a useful regulatory 
tool.',4 He still challenges the utility of the common law, however, 
because "we don't really know very much about how much 
environmental protection the common law independently could 
provide, and we have reason to be skeptical that the right sorts of 
cases will percolate into the judicial system for resolution.,,5 Without 
offering what might ever be, in his view, that "right sort of case," he 
points to what he considers a bad case-a "diffuse, low-probability, 
multi-lateral, and temporally remote harms" that the courts "aren't the 
best" at addressing.6 This example is clearly bothering him, indeed, 
perhaps it is the very reason he wrote the essay: it is "global 
warming.,,7 
Thus, it seems that Buck's essay is really not about the weaknesses 
of the common law in general (and there are indeed many) but rather 
a specific attack on the merits of the most recent innovative (catalytic) 
uses of the common law in context of the U.S. policy debate over a 
federal response to global climate change. Whether Buck's objections 
are truly jurisprudential or simply climate-skeptical, his provocative 
3 Id. at 644. Buck sets up a caricature of common law advocates: "But do we have reason 
to believe that courts should be the only governmental vehicles for setting wide-ranging social 
policy as to environmental law?" Id. (emphasis in original). What is missing from his 
provocative point here and elsewhere in the essay is a citation to a source who may have stated 
the utility of the common law in such a radical and unrealistic way. 
4 Id. at 646. 
s Id. (emphasis added). 
6 Id. 
7 Buck, supra note 2, at 646. 
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essay provides a good reason to review how modem-day 
environmental practitioners are using the common law and the courts 
to work around the infirmities of unresponsive statutory schemes in 
the face of continuing and growing environmental problems. 
As a co-editor of a recent book suggesting that the common law 
does have a useful role to play even in the highly developed statutory 
context of environmental law,8 I obviously have a divergent view 
from Buck. In Creative Common Law Strategies for Protecting the 
Environment, my co-editor Cliff Rechtshaffen and I deliberately set 
about collecting the stories from current practitioners who are actively 
using the common law to address a wide variety of environmental 
problems that have been ignored by the political process. From 
contamination of groundwater by MTBE in California, and polluting 
factory farms in the Midwest, to large agricultural landowners freely 
diverting water from taro famers in Hawaii, the major cases today 
invoking common law remedies have a shared theme: the 
community's frustration with the lack of legislative solutions to 
persistent environmental crises. As Professor Joseph Sax explains in 
the Preface of our book, the collection of stories written by these 
practitioners about their cases is "cause for celebration and emulation, 
but it is also distressing evidence of the extent to which our statutory 
scheme has failed to fulfill the promise that was so bright a few 
decades ago.,,9 He concludes, "the common law method will always 
be an essential tool for addressing the problems we face.,,10 Can 
Sax-widely considered as a central figure in the creation of the 
modem statutory era of environmental law (a system which Buck 
seems to admire)-be a valid straw man for Buck's polemic attacking 
the common law? Hardly. 
Neither my co-editor nor I suggest that our modem statutory 
scheme be ditched for a common-law based system. In fact, we very 
carefully stated the opposite: 
We wish to be clear, however, that this book is not a call for 
dismantling statutory protections and returning to a legal regime that 
places primarily reliance on the common law for remedying 
environmental harms. . . . . As experience before the 1970s starkly 
illuminates, the common law by itself is incapable of addressing the 
multitude of threats to human health, air, water, land, and wildlife 
posed by the complex, modem industrial society in which we live. 
8 CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (Clifford 
Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini, Eds., Environmental Law Institute 2007) [hereinafter 
CREATIVE COMMON LAW]. 
9 Joseph L. Sax, Preface, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 8. 
10 Id. 
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Environmental regulation has produced impressed and important 
gains in the quality of our environment over the past 35 years. But ... 
there are still significant gaps in the web of protection woven by 
environmental statutes-gaps that can be effectively filled by a 
vibrant common law. In short, common law remedies are critically 
needed to supplement, not supplant, statutory approaches to 
protecting the environment. II 
SO, there should be a lot of room for Buck and me to agree. If only 
we could agree on the right questions. Unfortunately, it is how Buck 
provocatively phrases the questions in his essay, and his frequent 
resort to a straw man technique, that makes it almost impossible to 
find a common ground for a hearty discussion. 
For example, on the issue of advocates' allegations of the 
"superiority" of the common law compared to agency regulation,12 
Buck says he is "agnostic,,13 but his tone, and in fact his entire essay, 
is wholly dismissive of the idea that the common law might have 
some advantages. A serious error in Buck's critique is to treat 
statutory law and common law as potential legal equivalents. They 
simply are not, even if they may have similar goals. As Buck 
acknowledges, "[t]o be sure, the fact that the common law can be 
tailored to local circumstances can be an advantage.,,14 That is, in fact, 
a key strength of the common law. 
To assess if the common law "works," Buck rattles off a series of 
rhetorical questions and then seems just to give up, concluding "we 
can't agree on what the end is," therefore "we can't agree on how 
well the common law achieves a particular end.,,15 I'm stumped about 
why he is stumped. The "end" must surely be protection of the 
environment and human health. Even if this is not his personal goal, 
and even if we differ greatly on the means to achieve it, we (along 
with the host of scholars who have examined the relative value of 
common versus statutory law) should be able to agree on this "end." 
Moreover, the damning questions Buck poses-such as "Is it simply 
to gain the maximal amount of environmental protection, at whatever 
cost?"-are not unique to the common law, they are equally 
applicable to the statutory world. The macro-level legislative process 
is fraught with compromise, balancing, and the influence of "non-
II A Roadmap of the Book, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 8 (emphasis in 
original). 
12 Buck, supra note 2. 
13 Id. at 630. 
14 Id. at 641. 
15 Id. at 630. His confusion, confusingly, crops up again later: "assuming we could all 
agree on what 'up to the task' even means." Id. at 633. 
2008] A ITA CKING BANANAS 667 
environmental" values. At the micro-level of common law lawsuits, 
the same is true: context is everything. As Buck writes, "It all 
depends on the court, the agency, the issue at hand.,,16 But it also 
depends on the parties, the motives, the costs, the timing, and the 
evidence. And, particularly as common law accretes, on precedent. 
Neither approach is pure or simple. Both involve complicated mixes 
of law, fact, and politics. The indictment of the common law for these 
supposed failings is not warranted. 
Buck also complains that "little solid empirical evidence" exists to 
support the value of the common law. 17 So, he concludes, its value 
cannot be compared to major statutes like the Clean Water Act. By 
oversimplifying the meaning of "empirical" as solely quantitative, he 
ignores the value of qualitative (e.g., case-based) "data" that can 
inform this discussion. He says "anecdotal evidence only gets you so 
far,,,18 and then sets up his own imaginary three-point test for the 
validity of any useful information, stating that it must be 
"measurable" data over a twenty-year period with a baseline of 
pollution levels. 19 He adds that, for the data to be good, "[o]f course, 
you'd also have to have reliable data for that entire time period for all 
of the other factors that might affect the levels of pollution,,,2o adding 
more hurdles to the challenge and setting up a schema that the best 
empiricist could never meet. Even very good empirical studies of 
statutory law cannot achieve this statistical purity. He says so himself: 
"To my knowledge, no one has ever done a study that is remotely like 
what I have discussed. And I doubt that anyone can.,,21 Indeed. Then, 
why set up a surrealistic test? Perhaps his purpose is to make his next 
four-part test, adopted from Steven Shavell, seem more appropriate. 
This more interesting approach, however, also does not prove his 
unprovable point. 
With respect to the first part of his modified Shavell test-
knowledge about risky activities-Buck states that the common law 
may be better than statutory law because "private parties will 
probably have better information than regulators" about risk.22 Here I 
agree with Buck, but this is true if one differentiates between a site-
specific problem (which is the typical target of common law) and a 
regional or national problem (which is the typical target of statutory 
16 [d. at 636. 
17 Buck, supra note 2, at 630. 
18 !d. at 63l. 
19 !d. at 631-632. 
20 [d. at 632 (emphasis added). 
21 [d. at 633. 
22 Buck, supra note 2, at 633. 
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law). In other words, the analysis again requires recognition of the 
fundamentally diverse nature of common law cases (largely based on 
state common law and filed in state courts) compared to statutes 
(primarily federal in the modern environmental scheme used as a 
comparison by Buck). (He might argue, and I might agree, that this 
distinction does not hold true in the climate change cases. However, 
those cases are clearly designed to be catalytic not interstitial, that is, 
to prompt policy change as well as seeking to achieve an ultimate 
injunctive or damages remedy, which is proving quite elusive.) 
When he asks whether common law plaintiffs have superior 
information about "general issues of environmental consequences," 
such as "endangered species two states away,,23 the straw man 
reappears. Common law cases, even if filed in federal court, are state 
law cases involving localized environmental risks. Although some 
commentators, including me, hold out hope for a resurgence in 
federal common law,24 I cannot think of a common law case 
involving cross-boundary endangered species issues but perhaps I am 
mistaken; maybe there are creative litigators pushing this case theory 
(and, if so, I would love to know). On the other hand, of course, 
cross-boundary species issues are the essence of the federal ESA and 
much litigation. So, the very nature of Buck's question provides him 
an answer. 
His next criticism of common law litigation, that juries are less 
capable than regulators in understanding environmental problems, is 
quite puzzling. He states, "It seems unlikely that the average jury has 
better information than do PhD chemical engineers working for 
the EPA. . . ,,25 Perhaps Buck's experience as an appellate clerk for 
two years has unduly limited his view of how trials really work. He 
ignores completely the role of expert witnesses, and the frequent 
battle of experts, in cases involving environmental pollution. The 
parties are highly motivated to present the best possible quality 
information to the jury, and the judge must screen the qualifications 
of the experts. Juries are not flying solo, but they do filter the facts 
based on their own community experience. Indeed, that is their civic 
responsibility. Buck later gets this right: "[b]oth sides can produce 
studies and expert testimony, but at the end of the day, the outcome 
will depend on which side manages to explain and justify its position 
2J [d. at 634. 
24 See CREATIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 47-159 (discussing the Milwaukee [and 
II cases). 
25 Buck, supra note 2, at 634. 
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to an impartial outsider. ,,26 This is right. But then why the baseless 
attack on juries earlier? 
What is unclear is whether Buck is arguing that trial, or appellate, 
judges are any better at reviewing conflicting expert testimony in the 
cold statutory context. Or, if he thinks that agency experts are 
necessarily superior to the parties' experts. Quixotically, he criticizes 
the very agency experts that he put on a pedestal a few paragraphs 
before. He finds that they may be too narrow-minded having put 
"their lives and souls into studying a particular type of emissions," 
which "tempt[s them] to regulate it into the ground, while ignoring 
the question of whether such regulation is the best use of society's 
resource~."27 But Buck admits that even "educated judges" need 
environmental cases to be "boiled down into terms" that they can 
understand, otherwise "then perhaps the rationale isn't such a good 
one.,,28 Buck's clerkship experience serves him well on point. Law 
clerks know particularly well that judges are human too. It may be 
that Buck thinks neither juries (in common law cases) nor judges (in 
statutory review cases) are competent. But his alternative solution to 
providing redress other than these two currently used legal avenues is 
not at all evident. Free market? Eliminate legal remedies? 
In addressing "ability to pay," Buck argues-without citation, 
example, or support-that some polluters may not be able to pay for 
the harm they create.29 He says, "this factor weighs against the 
common law.,,30 It does? To the contrary, it seems a stronger 
indictment of the market model, which often fails to force 
internalization of harmful externalities. He also assumes that polluters 
will utterly ignore judgments if they cannot pay (a strange argument 
given long-standing judicial mechanisms for enforcing judgments) 
but he also dismisses the option of injunctive relief (a primary goal, 
for example, in public nuisance cases). This weak criticism may 
reflect his unfamiliarity with the world of common law environmental 
litigation. In contrast, he seems to think that regulatory approaches 
work like a magic wand, "require[ing] the polluter to meet certain 
standards from Day One.,,3l Even the biggest fans of statutory law 
should see the issue in a more complex way. Buck ignores the myriad 
real-world problems of permit challenges, non-compliance, non-
enforcement, and the frequent "ability to pay" issues presented in the 
26 [d. at 635. 
27 [d. 
28 [d. at 636. 
29 /d. 
30 /d. 
31 Buck, supra note 2, at 636. 
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statutory context. Neither system has a monopoly on efficiency of 
enforcement. 
On the issue of "access bias" and "process bias," Buck does a 
much better job of laying out the difficulties that plaintiffs face in 
both the common law and statutory contexts. As he indicates, lack of 
initial awareness of the pollution in the first place is a big problem. In 
fact, it is an enormous problem. Then, of course, there are the 
problems of causation or traceability. These barriers all come back to 
haunt statutory plaintiffs particularly in the context of statutory 
standing. In the common law context, these plaintiffs may need to 
clear the harsh "different in kind" test for public nuisance,32 but under 
other theories (such as private nuisance or general negligence), actual 
or threatened injury will suffice. Here, Buck shows a finer 
appreciation for the general weaknesses of the legal system in 
addressing environmental harm. 
At bottom, Buck's true concern about the value of the common 
law seems to come down to the global warming cases, which he calls 
"the prime example of environmental harm that is not likely to be 
addressed by common law courts, at least not very well.,,33 His dislike 
for the global warming cases comes out more colorfully when he 
suggests that courts cannot do much about climate change because, 
"we all emit carbon in some form, even if only by exhaling.,,34 He 
then mockingly suggests that the "entire Pacific Rim, as a class, 
should sue the entire industrialized world.,,35 His facetious suggestion 
unfortunately does not add much to our struggle to understand the 
role, good or bad, of catalytic environmental common law litigation. 
But it may reveal something about the true bogeyman feared by 
critics of the common law. The bigger the banana, the bigger the 
counter-attack. 
As explained by Matt Pawa, one of the key strategists behind the 
American Electric Power lawsuits, now pending in the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals,36 the cases were brought in response to the lack of 
response from the George W. Bush Administration to the climate 
change crisis. Specifically, the public nuisance lawsuit, seeking only 
injunctive relief, was filed after the Administration announced it 
would not support amendment of the Clean Air Act to impose new 
32 See Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the 
Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 755 (2001). 
33 Id. at 18. 
34 Id. at 18. 
35 Id. at 18. 
36 Matthew Pawa, Global Warming: The Ultimate Public Nuisance, in CREATIVE 
COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 107--63. 
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emissions limits on C02, and after the White House disavowed the 
Kyoto Protocol.37 Ultimately, the district court dismissed the case sua 
sponte on the basis of the political question doctrine.38 At its core, 
even those who disagree with the basis of the district court's dismissal 
can agree that this case is fundamentally about whether the courts will 
seize the common law opportunity to press forward on solutions, even 
partial, to climate change. As Pawa stated, "we have brought to bear 
an important additional tool for addressing an environmental problem 
of exceptional importance.,,39 
Similarly, in the similar California common law case addressing 
climate change40-but this time seeking damages under a public 
nuisance theory-the lead attorney, Ken Alex, viewed the case as a 
catalyst for legislative action.41 He explained, "[b loth lawsuits were 
carefully crafted by the states' attorneys to respond to failures of the 
federal government to address the growing threat of global 
warming.,,42 California and the other states involved in the cases 
"[s]tepp[ed] into that void," and "beg[an] aggressively to seek basic 
tort remedies against major sources of [greenhouse gas emissions], in 
addition to undertaking their own legislative and regulatory 
initiatives.,,43 Alex acknowledges that the cases are challenging to the 
legal system, but concludes that "[t]he genius of the common law is 
its ability to address new pollution problems using long-established 
principles validated by decades of judicial precedent to effect 
sometimes profound changes.,,44 
Both of these cases, as well as others more recently filed-such as 
the Kivalina case brought by an Alaska Native village of Inupiat 
Eskimo under public nuisance theory against two dozen oil, power, 
and coal companies, filed in February 200845 -show that the common 
law will continue to be used by environmental advocates, even if not 
always producing an immediate or direct "win," until there is a 
sufficient national statutory response to climate change. The very 
nature of the common law is to evolve with the times, to adapt to 
social needs. Unfortunately, the pace of change arising from these 
37 Id. at 124. 
38 Id. at 141. 
39 Id. at 163. 
40 California v. General Motors, et aI., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (Sept. 17,2007) 
4\ Ken Alex, California's Global Warming Lawsuit: The Case/or Damages, in CREATIVE 
COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 165-71. 
42 Id. at 166. 
43 Id. at 166. 
44 Id. at 171. 
45 See Climate Change Threatens Existence, Eskimo Lawsuit Says, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2008IWORLD/americas/02/26/us.warming.ap/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). Matt Pawa is also 
on the team of attorneys who brought this lawsuit. /d. 
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innovative climate change cases, which not enjoyed a wann welcome 
in the courts so far, is glacial. And, for those who seek action on 
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, the window of time for 
altering the course of real-world events is simply too short for 
ponderous judicial action to succeed on its own. Yet, the climate 
change cases are a modem example of the classic role of the common 
law. 
In conclusion, Buck's essay raises many questions about the 
resurgence of "environmental common law,,46 but the wrong ones. 
Worse, he answers even many of those questions unsatisfactorily. In 
the "Self-Defense Against Fresh Fruit" skit, Cleese progressively kills 
each of his recruits while calmly demonstrating how to repel attacks 
from bananas and raspberries. Although Buck's essay is not nearly at 
lethal, it unfortunately has the same effect of substantially dampening 
the reader's interest in even inquiring further about the subtleties of 
the weakness and strengths of the common law. Cleese's ultimate 
response to the fruit attacks is to unleash a live tiger on his last 
remaining recruits. Buck's essay similarly unleashes an untamed 
rhetorical critique. Despite the flurry, creative well-grounded 
common law strategies will survive for years to come. They will 
continue to be an effective supplemental tool to address dangerous 
gaps in our modem environmental statutes and to catalyze long over-
due action on governmental policy. 
46 CREATIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 10. 
